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Here we introduce a new method of testing the stand of a 
postdictive appraisal of one’s intentionality. To be specific, we 
equate here “intentionality” with subjects’ capacity of assessing 
the physical causes of their actions inasmuch as the notion of 
intentionality is meaningless in the absence of such assessment. 
The method capitalizes on subject’s retrospective judgments on 
the feasibility of a just executed synchronization motor task and 
on whether this task had been executed in a speeded/“reactive” or 
delayed/“intentional” mode. Such distinction is not more concep-
tually debatable (Pashler, 1998; Nachev et al., 2008; Haggard, 2009) 
than the notion of volition/free will itself, ultimately an introspec-
tive belief. Here, the understanding is that a speeded/“reactive” 
action is spontaneous or irrepressible, hence non-intentional, 
while delayed/“intentional” requires pondering of stimulus 
parameters (such as speed) and internal factors (such as one’s 
reaction time, RT) and involves top-down processes (Frank et al., 
2009). A reactive action can be objectively operationalized as an 
action whose latency with respect to stimulation is in the range of 
subject’s simple RT and is based on bottom-up processes. This does 
not mean however that subjects necessarily use such a criterion 
for segregating their spontaneous vs. delayed responses. In fact, 
the present data show that they do not.
Subjects were requested to synchronize a key-press with the 
termination of a synchronization interval (SI; randomly shorter or 
longer than their RT) and thereafter to judge (in separate sessions) 
whether that interval had been long enough to allow synchroni-
zation (Q1), whether their motor response had been reactive or 
delayed (Q2), or whether SI had been long or short (Q3).
INTRODUCTION
There are claims in the field of voluntary action that the sense of agency 
and hence of volition relies on a post-hoc (i.e., non-causal) evaluation 
of performed actions rather than on predictive mental processes (see 
reviews by Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002; Haggard, 2005, 
2008, 2009; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2005; Hallett, 2007). Accordingly 
and in contrast with the “priority principle”1 (namely that “thought” 
comes before action; Wegner, 2002) the stand of a postdictive chain of 
mental events posits that action is promoted before thought (i.e., deci-
sion/intention to act) which is but an a posteriori interpretation of that 
action hence “corrupted” by the outcome of that action. It is in that sense 
that we equate “predictive” with “causal” (thought predicts/causes the 
ensued action) and postdictive with non-causal (action causes thought).
Most of the empirical approaches to the predictive–postdictive 
debate capitalized on the comparison between the introspected 
timing of the decision/intention to act and the timing of that 
action’s precursory neural activity (Libet, 1993; Lau et al., 2007; 
Haggard, 2008, 2009). This literature consistently showed that the 
introspected decision timing trails (sometimes by seconds; Soon 
et al., 2008) the timing of premotor activity. Such paradigms raise 
concerns about the very definition of intention, volition, etc. (e.g., 
Nachev et al., 2008), about subject’s capability of estimating the 
moment of his intention to act and about the techniques used for 
such assessments (Pockett, 2002; Danquah et al., 2008).
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A valid answer to Q1 requires subjects to compare their estimation 
of the current SI with their introspected RT, iRT (SI <> iRT). On the 
assumption that iRT is a constant (say the introspected mean RT 
acquired through life experience or within the very first trials of a RT 
experiment), subjects’ responses should correlate with SI irrespectively 
of their fluctuating synchronization response time (RsT), i.e., the out-
come of their action. However, the postdictive stand requires that their 
response to Q1 should be based on their trial-by-trial RT appraisal, a 
capacity known to exist (James, 1890; Gorea et al., 2010). To answer 
Q2 subjects should compare their current RsT and iRT (RsT <> iRT) 
so that their responses should correlate with their fluctuating RsT but 
not (or less) with SI. Q2 is all the more meaningful given that for the 
same SI subjects showed a bimodal RsT distribution with means sepa-
rated by more than 100 ms (see Results). To answer Q3 subjects only 
need to appraise the mean SI and the current SI (SI <> SI)2. Hence 
their responses should correlate again with SI. Basing their responses 
to Qs 1 and 3 on SI would substantiate the view that subjects have 
an objective appraisal of the external world (i.e., SI). In contrast, the 
stand of a postdictive/subjective appraisal of the world and hence of 
our intention to act upon it (i.e., react or delay our motor responses) 
predicts that subjects’ responses to Qs 1–3 will correlate with their 
RsT and/or with the RsT–SI difference more than with SI. For this 
to be the case, subjects must be able to appraise (consciously or not) 
and use their RsT on a trial-by-trial base. The present results show 
that subjects’ responses to the three questions asked mostly correlate 
with SI. We take this as evidence against the postdictive hypothesis. 
In the case of Q2, subjects’ reliance on SI shows that they prefer to 
rely on the external world even though such reliance is inappropriate 
(an “over-objectivization”). This suggests that subjects do not have 
conscious access to or, alternatively, do not remember what their deci-
sion (to react or delay their response) had been.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We describe below four distinct experiments two of which are pre-
liminary. The purpose of preliminary experiments was to assess 
subjects’ simple RT in a standard RT paradigm using the stimuli of 
the two main experiments. These RTs were subsequently compared 
with subjects points of subjective synchronization (PSS) derived 
as described below. Main Experiment 1 was run with a large but 
sparse sample of SI that in conjunction with subjects’ answers to 
Q1 were used to choose a narrower but denser range of SI to be 
run in the main Experiment 2. In the latter subjects answered each 
of the three questions mentioned in the Introduction.
STIMULI
The stimulus was a 1° thick virtual annulus (the “gauge”) with a 3° 
external edge radius (Figure 1A) that started to fill up (randomly at 
one out of eight locations marked by a radial bar) either up white 
(100 cd/m²) or in black (0.05 cd/m²) on a 50 cd/m² gray background. 
Polarity was swapped on each trial to prevent adaptation effects. 
The filling gage was displayed on a 19” E96f+SB ViewSonic screen 
(1024 × 768 pixels, 100 Hz refresh rate) 40 cm away from observ-
ers’ eyes. The filling-up was always counterclockwise (Figure 1B) 
and occurred randomly within one out of seven (0, 100, 200, 250, 
300, 400, 500 ms; Preliminary 2 and Experiment 1), or out of 21 
SIs (10 ms apart within a range of 200 ms more or less centered 
about each observer’s RT; Experiment 2; see Procedure). Stimulus 
presentation and response recording were controlled using the 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) under Matlab.
PROCEDURE
Preliminary 1: Participants were asked to react (press a key) as soon 
as possible to the appearance of the annular gage that was filled up 
from the start (SI = 0). Each subject performed 100 trials in one 
single session. Preliminary 2: As above but this time with seven SIs 
(hence speeds) between 0 and 500 ms (see Stimuli) randomized 
across trials. There were 80 trials per SI and per subject distributed 
in two sessions.
Figure 1 | Spatial (A) and temporal (B) display of the stimulus. Note the different ranges of the SI used and the different questions asked in Experiments 1 and 2.
2Estimating the mean of a uniform distribution has been shown to be achieved over 
the first 10–20 trials and to yield discrimination accuracies in a 2AFC task equiva-
lent to those obtained in the presence of the standard (Morgan et al., 2000; Brown 
and Steyvers, 2005; Gorea et al., 2010).
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SUbjECTS
They were five master students (four male) with normal or cor-
rected to normal vision aged in-between 23–25 years. Only one of 
them had had extensive training with the specific paradigm and 
was acquainted with the purpose of the experiment.
RESULTS
The median and mean RTs assessed with the filled gage 
(227.4 ± 15.9 ms and 230.6 ± 13.1 ms; Preliminary 1) and with 
the randomized filling-up durations (230.4 ± 8 ms and 242.6 ± 12.1; 
Preliminary 2) were not statistically different.
Figure 2A presents mean RsTs for each participant (different 
symbols; keep in mind that RT and RsT refer to response time 
measured in speeded and in a synchronization response mode, 
respectively) as a function of SI in Experiment 1. This represen-
tation is not quite legitimate as at least three of the seven RsT 
means per subject were derived from bimodal RsT distributions (as 
assessed by Akaike Information Criterion, AIC; Akaike, 1974), with 
all subjects showing bimodal RsT distributions for SI = 0 and for 
SI = 500 ms. These bimodal RsT distributions for the two extreme 
SIs are exemplified in Figures 2a1,a2 for a typical subject, SL). 
The average difference between the means of the two distribu-
tions is 129 ms for SI = 0 and of 109 ms for SI = 500 ms. Averaging 
RsTs over such bimodal distributions accounts for subjects’ too 
early synchronization responses (i.e., RsTs below the main dashed 
diagonal) for the longest two SIs (400 and 500 ms; for such SIs, 
subjects show perfect synchronization under blocked SI condi-
tions; Gorea et al., 2010). While the source of this bimodality is of 
critical interest in understanding the synchronization process (an 
issue addressed in an ongoing study), it is of little relevance for the 
present topical issue. It is worth noting, however, that the means 
of the fastest RsT distributions averaged over the five subjects for 
SI = 0 (249 ± 29.8 ms) are close to and not significantly different 
from their mean RTs assessed in the two preliminary (RT) experi-
ments (230.6 ± 13 and 242.6 ± 12.1 ms). This suggests that in mixed 
SI blocks including SIs too short to synchronize with, subjects’ 
behavior alternates in about equal proportions between reactive 
and delayed response modes.
Figure 2a3 displays the cumulative Gaussian (μ, σ) fitted to 
subject’s SL “Yes” responses to Q1 in Experiment 1 (Neider–Mead 
simplex algorithm). The means of such functions fitted to each 
participant’s “Yes” responses are their PSS
SI
 and have been used 
as midpoints of the 200 ms SI range tested in Experiment 2. A 
first notable observation from Figure 2 is that the PSS
SI 
averaged 
over the five participants in Experiment 1 (246.4 ± 34.2 ms) are 
similar to these participants’ mean RTs assessed in the preliminary 
experiments and to their mean RsTs derived from their fastest RsT 
distributions for SI = 0 (249.0 ± 29.8 ms). This suggests that subjects 
have an accurate implicit knowledge of their mean RT and use it 
when answering Q1.
The restricted SI range about each participant’s PSS
SI
 used in 
Experiment 2 (in-between 117–183 to 317–383 ms) ensured that 
they operated in an uncertainty react/delay range and that their 
RsTs were minimally correlated with SI (so as to maximize the dis-
entanglement between subjects’ putative reliance, when answering 
any of the three questions, on SI from their reliance on RsT and, as 
a consequence, on the SI-RsT difference). That this was achieved 
Comparing the mean RTs obtained in Preliminary 1 and 2 was 
meant to test the SI effect per se. As no such effect was found, 
mean RTs were subsequently compared with subjects’ PSS derived 
from their binary classification responses in Experiments 1 and 2. 
In both these experiments participants were asked to synchronize 
their key-presses with the moment the filling of the gage was com-
pleted. In Experiment 1 this range was the same as in Preliminary 2. 
After each motor synchronization response participants provided 
a binary response to Q1:
Q1: Has the current SI been long enough for you to synchronize with?
The mean of the cumulative Gaussian fit to the frequency of 
“Yes” responses as a function of SI is referred to as participant’s 
PSS derived relatively to the SI, PSS
SI
. For the reasons given below, 
this PSS
SI
 was used to determine for each subject a narrower and 
denser SI range to be run in Experiment 2. In this second experi-
ment, subjects responded to the following two additional questions:
Q2: Have you reacted or delayed your response to achieve 
synchronization?
Q3: Has the current SI been short or long?3
To any of the questions above subjects responded by pressing the 
left (“Yes: long enough,” “reacted,” “short”) or right arrow key on the 
keyboard. Observers were specifically and repeatedly instructed not to 
base their response on the delay between the gauge filling up comple-
tion and their RsT.
Clearly, very short (SI  RT) and very long (SI  RT) SIs would 
(and did) entail 100% reliable responses to Q1 as such intervals 
will most obviously be beyond and within subject’s synchroniza-
tion capacities independently of his RsT, or even in the absence 
of any motor response. This would also be the case for Qs 2, 3 
(see Introduction and below). Instead, an SI range narrowly lim-
ited about the reaction/proaction transition point as given by PSS
SI 
(and, as it will be shown, close to participant’s RT), will entail much 
less reliable answers to any of the three questions asked. This opens 
the possibility that participants will appeal to their introspectively 
estimated RsT as an alternative source of information (even though 
less reliable than a “direct” SI estimation; see Gorea et al., 2010). An 
additional advantage of using a relatively narrow SI range about 
each participant’s PSS
SI 
is that it dilutes the correlation between SI 
and RsT, a necessary condition for disentangling (at least partly) 
participant’s reliance on one or the other. Reliance on RsT should 
be even more pronounced given that subjects can compare the 
moment of the completion of the gage (a visual signal) and their own 
RsT (motor and proprioceptive signals). Under such conditions, 
observers are capable of judging their synchronization response (i.e., 
whether it had been early or delayed) with an accuracy of less than 
±50 ms, more than twice better than their perceptual estimation of 
the SI they have to synchronize with (Gorea et al., 2010).
Given the considerations above, Experiment 2 was a re-run of 
Experiment 1 but with a 200 ms SI range centered on each partici-
pant’s PSS
SI
. Each of the three questions was asked and answered in 
blocked sessions. There were 40 trials per SI and per session (i.e., 
40 × 7 = 280 trials/session) repeated four times (i.e., a total of 160 
trials per SI, participant and question asked). At least 5 s breaks 
were imposed after every 20 trials.
3Note that none of the three Qs bears on participant’s estimate of his key-press 
being early or delayed with respect to SI.
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RsT, and SI-RsT) confirms these observations, namely a  significant 
index effect4 [F(2,8) = 13.8, p = 0.021] but no question-type effect 
(F = 5.3, p = 0.076). A partial comparison reveals a significantly 
steeper SI-related than (SI-RsT)-related slope [F(1,4) = 3.44, 
p = 0.02]. Table 1 also displays the point-biserial correlations (r
PB
; 
Lev, 1949) between the binary (Yes/No) and the continuous (SI, 
RsT, and SI-RsT) variables. As it should, the steepness of the fit-
ted functions and r
PB
 show a high negative correlation (r = −0.62, 
p  0.001). In short, the data clearly show that whatever the ques-
tion asked participants base their responses on the actual duration 
of SI with practically no “postdictive” interference of their motor 
synchronization response.
Additional support for this conclusion transpires from a closer 
look at subjects’ PSSs and RTs. As already noted, RTs are practically 
identical when directly measured in the preliminary RT experiments 
with the gage instantaneously filled (SI = 0) or filling-up over 0 to 
500 ms intervals or when derived from the fastest RsT distribution to 
the instantaneously filled up gage in the synchronization Experiment 
1 (black circle, square, and triangle in column “RT” of Figure 4). To 
answer the introspective Qs 1 and 2, subjects must, in principle, refer 
their responses to their introspected RT. The fact that the PSS
SI
 (col-
umn “PSS_SI” in Figure 4) derived from their answers to these ques-
tions (Q1, solid red and open blue circles for Experiments 1 and 2, 
respectively; Q2, open blue square, Experiment 2) are about equal to 
their RTs, while the corresponding PSS
RsT
 (column “PSS_RsT”; same 
colors and symbols) differ markedly from the RTs as well as across 
experiments (circle vs. square) and subjects (error bars) support the 
notion that subjects’ introspection was based on the SIs rather than 
on their own RsT. As the mean of the SIs used in Experiment 2 was 
is demonstrated by the shallow slopes [0.06–0.3; r ∈ (0.11–0.48)] 
of the mean RsT vs. SI functions displayed for each participant in 
Figure 2B (same symbols as in Figure 2A). It remains however that 
for this restricted 200 ms SI range, the RsT distributions covered an 
average range of 214 ± 27 ms across the five subjects, much smaller 
than the RT range obtained in the preliminary RT experiments over 
an equivalent SI range (126 ± 9 ms). This indicates that subjects 
tempted to synchronize their key-press with the completion of the 
SI rather than reacting to the onset of the gage. On a number of 
occasions, subjects may have nonetheless responded to the onset 
of the gage (i.e., reacted) rather than to its completion.
Figure 3 shows the percentages of “Yes” responses of the same 
representative participant as in Figures 2a1–a3 for each of the three 
questions asked (circles, squares and triangles for Q1, Q2, and Q3) 
together with the corresponding cumulative Gaussian fits as a func-
tion of SI (3a), RsT (3b), and SI-RsT (3c). Whatever the question 
asked, the steepest sigmoids (smallest σ) are obtained when the 
“Yes” responses are related to SI (σ
SI 
= 36.9 ± 1.7 ms), slightly shal-
lower when related to SI-RsT (σ
SI-RsT
 = 43.1 ± 3.0 ms) and flat for 
all practical reasons when related to RsT (σ
RsT
 = 235.8 ± 102.2 ms). 
These observations are true for all participants (with two marginal 
exceptions out of 15 comparisons for Q1, subjects MD and CR) 
as shown in Table 1. While the possibility that subjects may have 
partially based their judgments on the SI-RsT difference cannot be 
entirely excluded, the present results show that this difference was 
not their main source of information.
At a first look, the accuracy of participants’ judgments appears to 
depend on the question asked (σ
Q1
 = 170.9 ± 134.1; σ
Q2
 = 68.3 ± 23.8; 
σ
Q3
 = 76.7 ± 38.1 ms) but this is mainly due to the very inaccurate 
responses to Q1 when related to RsT (σ
RsT,Q1
 = 439 ± 121.8 ms). A 
two-way ANOVA (factors: question-type and relevant index, i.e., SI, 
Figure 2 | Synchronization response times (rsT) as a function of Si 
in experiments 1 (A) and 2 (B) of all five participants (different symbols) 
together with representative bimodal rsT distributions of participant 
SL for Si = 0 (a1) and Si = 500 ms (a2) as well as a representative 
cumulative gaussian fitted to this subject’s “Yes” responses to Q1 
as a function of Si (a3). The dashed main diagonals in (A) and (B) show 
perfectly synchronized RsTs. The double arrowed right-angle lines in a3 
point to this subject’s RsT at 50% “Yes” responses (i.e., the mean of the 
fitted Gaussian), i.e., his point of subjective synchronization referred to  
SI (PSSSI).
4All effects are corrected for sphericity – Greenhouse–Geisser.
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on the objective duration of the interval they have to synchronize 
with whether in response to an introspective (Q1, Q2) or “objective” 
(Q3) question. Finally, the possibility that subjects calibrated their 
responses (whatever the question asked) relatively to their average 
RsT is not supported by the data as these averages (“AV_RsT” column 
in Figure 4) are significantly above subjects’ RT and PSS
SI
.
by construction equal to the PSS
SI 
derived in Experiment 1 (red solid 
circle), the PSSs derived from subjects’ responses to Q3 (that bore 
on the SI itself) should coincide with the mean SI. This is the case 
for the PSS
SI
 but not for the PSS
RsT
 implying once again that subjects 
based their responses to Q3, as they should have, on the estimated 
SI and not on their own RsT. Hence, subjects base their judgments 
Figure 3 | Percentage of “Yes” responses to Qs1-3 (circles, squares, and triangles, respectively) of a representative subject (SL) as a function of Si (A), rsT 
(B), and Si-rsT (C) together with the best cumulative gaussian fits (sigmoids of corresponding colors). Insets show the respective means and SDs of the fits.
Table 1 | Standard deviations of the cumulative gaussians fitted to subjects’ “Yes” responses to each of the three questions asked in experiment 2 
as a function of the synchronization interval (σSi), response time (σrsT), and Si-rsT (σSi-rsT; odd cols) together with the corresponding point-biserial 
correlations (rPB; even cols).
 Q1: Has the current Si been long Q2: Have you reacted or waited to Q3: Has the current Si been 
 enough for you to synchronize with? achieve synchronization? short or long?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sjs σSI rPB,SI σRsT rPB,RsT σSI-RsT rPB,SI -RsT σSI rPB,SI σRsT rPB,RsT σSI-RsT rPB, SI-RsT σSI rPB,SI σRsT rPB,RsT σSI-RsT rPB, SI-RsT
LG 37 0.76 154 0.18 39 0.68 47 0.70 60 0.42 56 0.55 32 0.77 53 0.45 39 0.64
SL 35 0.75 806 0.03 54 0.68 36 0.75 118 0.19 49 0.66 26 0.81 161 0.13 38 0.74
MD 32 0.78 229 0.07 32 0.76 35 0.76 66 0.21 41 0.71 41 0.74 114 0.17 45 0.69
CR 34 0.75 622 0.03 28 0.75 60 0.62 219 0.08 62 0.60 41 0.74 75 0.19 42 0.70
MG 36 0.77 384 0.07 41 0.71 44 0.67 218 0.11 53 0.60 38 0.74 361 0.07 44 0.69
μ 34.8 0.76 439 0.08 38.8 0.72 44.4 0.70 136 0.20 52.2 0.62 35.6 0.76 153 0.20 41.6 0.69
σ 1.92 0.01 272 0.06 10.0 0.04 10.11 0.06 78.4 0.13 7.85 0.06 6.50 0.03 123 0.15 3.05 0.04
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be calibrated with respect to subjects’ introspected mean reaction 
time. The observation that responses to Q2, that bears on subjects’ 
past decision to react or to delay action, do not correlate with their 
actual RsT implies that, at least in the present experimental condi-
tions, subjects cannot access or, alternatively, do not remember what 
this decision had been. This observation raises serious doubts about 
the experimental paradigm used in many studies where subjects 
were asked to specify when their decision to act had been taken (e.g., 
Libet, 1993; see Pockett, 2002; Danquah et al., 2008).
Reactive and delayed movements are known to reflect (e.g., Frith 
et al., 1991; Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Jenkins et al., 2000; Brass and 
Haggard, 2007; Haggard, 2008, 2009) and actually be triggered by the 
activity of distinct neural networks hypothesized to subtend reflexive 
and deliberate actions, respectively (Desmurget et al., 2009). While 
the distinction between such responsive modes is fuzzy (Nachev 
et al., 2008; Ridderinkhof et al., 2011), it is widely accepted that 
they involve bottom-up vs. top-down processes (e.g., Frank et al., 
2009; Ridderinkhof et al., 2011). Hence their segregation according 
to the response latencies remains an acceptable operationalization.
The anatomo-physiological distinction between the two response 
modes does not appear to be sustained by subjects’ presently assessed 
introspective judgments of their actions having been reactive or delayed 
(Q2). This is so even though, in contrast with previous laboratory 
manipulations of volition (of the kind “Have free will now!” – see 
Haggard, 2009), subjects’ switch from a reactive to a delayed response 
mode was entirely under their own control. The conundrum appears 
to be solved, though not conceptually, by Desmurget et al.’s (2009) 
astonishing findings that stimulation of distinct cortices may trigger 
the “intention and desire” to move a limb or the lips together with the 
feeling of having done so in the absence of any corresponding elec-
tromyographic activity (inferior parietal regions) and reciprocally, an 
overt movement without the “feeling” of having executed it (premotor 
area). In as much as the “consciousnesses” of acting and the action itself 
appear to be dissociated (or at least dissociable), it is not more remark-
able to admit that reactive and delayed actions may not be consciously 
dissociable either. Such dissociations are actually amply documented in 
amputees and anosognostic patients (for the first type of dissociation) 
and in patients with utilization behavior or with delusions of control 
(for the second type of dissociation; Frith et al., 2000). Temptingly, one 
would take such intention/action dissociations as evidence in favor of 
the notion that free will is but an illusion (Wegner, 2002). The present 
results provide paradoxical denotations in this respect. On the one 
hand, subjects’ incapacity of retrospectively classifying their reactive 
vs. delayed motor response (Q2) based on the actual latency of this 
response comforts the view of an illusory free will. On the other hand, 
the fact that subjects judge their capacity of synchronizing a motor 
response with a random time interval based on their estimation of this 
interval rather than on their introspected response time (Q1) implies 
that their judgment is causal (or predictive) in nature (i.e., not based 
on the outcome of their action or postdictive), a prerequisite of the 
free will stand. Hence, not astonishingly, the present experiments and 
results reveal an intrinsic duality of the free will concept debated since 
the antiquity (e.g., Bobzien, 1998; O’Keefe, 2005).
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DISCUSSION
The present experiments demonstrate that despite observers  having 
explicit feedback on their motor synchronization response with the 
completion of a random time interval, their introspective judgment 
of their synchronization capacity relative to the length of this interval 
(Q1) or of them having been in a reactive or delayed motor response 
mode (Q2) are poorely, if at all, related to the timing of their actual 
synchronization response but strongly related to the physical duration 
of this interval. In fact, the accuracy of such introspective judgments 
is no different from that assessed when subjects are asked to judge 
the “absolute” duration of these same intervals (Q3). The statisti-
cal analysis shows that the accuracy of subjects’ judgments is higher 
when these judgments are referred to the time interval itself rather 
than to the difference between this interval and the timing of their 
synchronization response. The data also show that subjects’ PSS are 
not significantly different from their mean RT and less variable (over 
experiments and subjects) when derived from subjects’ answers to any 
of the three questions asked as a function of the actual duration of 
the SI than as a function of their synchronization RsT.
While it has been shown that judgements of a stimulus having 
entailed an action (such as the location of a saccade target and 
of the corresponding saccade landing) are not biased by putative 
motor errors (Collins et al., 2009; Munuera et al., 2009; Ostendorf 
et al., 2010), the present study is the first to show that introspection 
on one’s actions in relation to the events having triggered them is 
based on these events rather than on the outcome of the actions 
they have entailed. Notwithstanding, such introspection appears to 
Figure 4 | reaction times (rT; black symbols), points of subjective 
synchronization derived from the cumulative gaussian fits of the “Yes” 
responses as a function of the Si (PSS_Si) and as a function of subjects’ 
synchronization response time (PSS_rsT) and the means of these rsT 
(Av_rsT) as measured or derived from the different experiments. RTs 
measured in response to the instantaneously filled (SI = 0) gage and to a gage 
filling over 0 to 500 ms intervals are shown as the black circle and square, 
respectively. RT derived from the fastest RsT distribution to the 
instantaneously filled gage in the synchronization Experiment 1 is shown a the 
black triangle. PSS and Av_RsT derived from responses to questions 1, 2, and 
3 are shown as circles, squares, and triangles with their colors referring to the 
Experiment where they have been assessed (red, Experiment 1; blue, 
Experiment 2). The solid red circle is the PSSSI from Experiment 1 used as the 
midpoint of the SI range tested in Experiment 2. Each symbol is the average 
over the five participants with the vertical bars showing 1SE.
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